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Technology companies like Apple pride themselves on protecting its consumers’ data, 
which they express within their mission statement and by also encrypting their mobile 
devices. This encryption stalled an investigation conducted by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation in 2016, resulting in them taking Apple to court. There has been a lack of 
information about mobile forensic examiners perceptions on issue they face in the mobile 
forensic field. The purpose of this research study was to address the perceptions mobile 
forensic examiners experience when dealing with encryption, privacy, and national 
security concerns. This qualitative phenomenological study included interviews with 10 
mobile forensic examiners (two female and eight male) with at least 1 year of experience 
on key issues in the mobile forensic field. Results from this study, identified that mobile 
forensic examiners wanted to work with technology companies on encryption issues, 
however they did not have a solution on how to begin. Findings from this study can be 
used to move forward the conversation between the technology companies and mobile 
forensic examiners, in order to come to an understanding with each other, with a 
comprise everyone can live with. Future research can gather information on how the 
technology companies perceive the privacy and encryption concerns, resulting in positive 
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Introduction 
The purpose of this qualitative research study was to understand the barriers 
criminal investigators face when conducting mobile forensics investigations. While 
considering such barriers, security and privacy were also researched in terms of national 
security and mobile forensics. Cultural differences between law enforcement and tech 
companies were acknowledged when considering national security and privacy. One-on-
one interviews with forensic examiners and criminal investigators as well as individuals 
from the private sector with different backgrounds helped fill a gap in research involving 
individuals’ perceptions concerning mobile forensics security and privacy. This helped in 
terms of addressing the importance of law enforcement perceptions regarding how they 
feel about barriers when mobile forensics meets national security and privacy at the same 
time. 
Background 
 In 2016, The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) responded to an active 
shooter incident in San Bernardino, CA. Upon responding to the incident and the shooter 
being fatally shot, agents wanted to gain access to the suspect iPhone. The FBI attempted 
to work with Apple to gain access via a backdoor, however Apple refused to help, stating 
privacy and security concerns if they created a backdoor to the device. This resulted in 
the FBI taking Apple to court, attempting to force them to work with them, by citing 
national security concerns.  During the Apple v. FBI case, it was clear that there was a 
lack of standards pertaining to national security, privacy, and mobile forensics. The court 
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did not get a chance to rule on whether Apple needed to create a back door for the FBI to 
access the device, as the FBI decided to drop the case prematurely and find alternative 
routes to get the information they needed. There is information concerning why mobile 
forensics is a method for law enforcement conducting investigations; however, there is a 
lack of information concerning costs of mobile forensics when considering privacy and 
national security. This is an issue that will get worse until the matter is addressed.  
Problem Statement 
The criminal justice system has an enduring issue that has never been properly 
resolved. That issue involves the amount of privacy citizens expect when it comes to their 
media equipment and criminal investigations conducted by law enforcement. According 
to Levy (2017), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) devalues privacy rights by 
coveting Apple’s security features to get into possible suspect iPhones. In 2016, an active 
shooter incident in San Bernardino, California demonstrated the amount of pressure and 
limits preventing law enforcement agencies from getting access to individuals’ personal 
devices in order to obtain what may be incriminating evidence. Mobile devices can hold a 
plethora of information on them to include calls logs, pictures, passwords, GPS data, 
system files and deleted data (Gillware, n.d.).  
According to the Interagency Security Committee (ISC, 2015), there were over 
160 active shooter incidents with 1,043 casualties between 2000 and 2013. Law 
enforcement serves as a form of protection to the public from those who have committed 
horrendous acts of crime. Companies were formerly against encryption security measures 
in their products; however, this has drastically changed over time, and now they are 
3 
 
refusing to not encrypt their products, causing concern for law enforcement agencies 
(Hosein, 2017). There is a lot of discussion on the topic; however, there is a lack of 
information regarding how individuals outside the tech and law enforcement field feel 
about the issue and how they perceive it. According to Makin and Morczek (2015), 
telecommunication providers can supply investigators with voice mail, call logs, and 
codes for accessing data contained on subscriber identity modules (SIM); however, those 
same companies can make it extremely difficult to trace communication because of legal 
processes that are potentially required. There is a lack of guidance throughout the 
criminal justice field in terms of what procedures and processes need to take place for 
investigators to conduct their investigations, especially when concerning mobile 
forensics. According to Cisco (2016), there were 11.6 billion mobile-connected devices 
in the year 2020. This study will fill the gap of lack of communication and understanding 
mobile forensic examiners and technology companies currently have amongst each other. 
Expanding and contributing to the body of knowledge needed to address this problem by 
addressing what the public, tech companies, and government agencies can do to discuss 
the issue with a possible compromise between security and privacy. 
Purpose 
The purpose of this qualitative research study was to understand barriers criminal 
investigators face when conducting mobile forensics investigations. While considering 
such barriers, security and privacy were also researched in terms of national security and 
mobile forensics. Focusing mainly on mobile forensics investigations, culture differences 
between law enforcement and the public were acknowledged when considering national 
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security and privacy. One-on-one interviews with forensic examiners and criminal 
investigators as well as individuals from the private sector with different backgrounds 
helped fill gaps in research where individuals’ perceptions concerning mobile forensics 
security and privacy had been vague. This helped in terms of acknowledging the 
importance of forensic examiners’ perceptions regarding how they felt about barriers 
involving mobile forensics meeting national security and privacy issues at the same time. 
Research Questions 
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations? 
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile 
forensic investigators concerning privacy rights? 
Framework 
The theoretical approach for this research study was Husserl’s phenomenology 
theory in which he focused on ideas. The phenomenology theory has been used 
throughout multiple studies involving individuals’ perceptions regarding incidents they 
have lived to experience. As forensic examiners have lived numerous experiences where 
they have dealt with encryption on mobile devices and had difficulty cracking the 
encryption, using this theory will help in terms of addressing their thoughts on the issue.   
Husserl’s phenomenology theory involves the perceptions of individuals. 
According to Smith (2016), phenomenology involves developing a descriptive or analytic 
psychology in that it describes and analyzes types of subjective mental activity or 
experiences. Blasdel (2010) said the purpose of using the phenomenological approach is 
to identify common themes.  
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. The phenomenology theory involves researchers including and reflecting on 
their own experiences in ways that elicit deeper and more profound participant responses 
(Miner-Romanoff, 2012). As a researcher, reflecting on personal experiences can in many 
ways be a potential weakness of this theory, as it may sway participants’ responses based 
of how questions are presented. Alawadhi (2019) said “researchers must aim to remove 
theory from the description of the phenomenon, or to bracket perceived notions and 
prejudices” (p. 79).  
Nature of the Study 
The nature of this research study was qualitative. Use of the qualitative approach 
allowed for perceptions of mobile forensic examiners to be coded and analyzed for 
potential themes. These themes were used to understand if there were potential patterns 
that existed when considering mobile forensics, privacy, and national security. Using an 
inductive approach, I analyzed themes from participants’ interviews to gain a generalized 
understanding. In order to understand barriers that mobile forensic examiners face when 
trying to conduct criminal investigations, Husserl’s phenomenology theory was applied. 
These barriers were discussed with forensic examiners, which may contrast with how 
tech companies may feel about the same issues. 
Definitions 
Acquisition: The process of making a forensic image from computer media such 
as a hard drive, thumb drive, CD-ROM, removable hard drives, servers, and other media 




Digital Forensics: The process of preservation, identification, extraction, and 
documentation of computer evidence which can be used in a court of law. 
Encryption: The process of changing plain text into random characters that only 
can only be decoded with the right passcodes. 
Federal Forensic Examiner: Examiners who work at the federal government 
level, instead of state and local levels. 
Imaging: Copying a physical storage device for conducting investigations and 
gathering evidence (Griffin, 2018). 
Mobile Forensics: A branch of digital forensics which involves acquisition and 
the analysis of mobile devices to recover digital evidence of investigative interest (Dcng, 
2015). 
Mobile Forensic Examiner: A forensic examiner who tends to specialize in 
mobile devices such as smartphones. 
Assumptions 
This study assumed that individuals participating in this study felt very strong 
about mobile forensics being an important field in digital forensics, especially when 
concerning criminal investigations, therefor their perceptions on what effects the field is 
important too. As participants use mobile forensics regularly to solve criminal 
investigations, they are not the decision makers when it comes to the scope of 
information they are allowed to collect or not. However, it was assumed that they were in 
position to best help decision makers understand the importance of mobile forensics and 
why sometimes individuals’ privacy may have been violated.  
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As forensic examiners often have some discretion when it involves mobile 
forensic investigations, it can be difficult to assume whether or not information retrieved 
in this investigation were rightly retrieved or viewed. This is important to acknowledge as 
privacy is one of the focal issues within this research study. 
Scope and Delimitations 
The study involved using interviews to understand participants’ perceptions 
regarding privacy and mobile forensics. Data was collected form a small participant 
group who were available to speak via video chat and had at least 1 year of experience 
with mobile forensics. As mobile forensics is a very specialized field, participants were 
expected to be technical inclined, as I was not planning to explain the field of mobile 
forensics. In order to address the potential of transferability, themes were compared to 
research concerning computer forensic encryption issues. There was a lack of scholarly 
research available to draw from regarding mobile forensic examiners perceptions on 
encryption, privacy, and national security. Detailed emails were sent to all participants 
who agreed to interviews, therefor ensuring every participant understood what they were 
agreeing to.  
Limitations 
Only certain mobile forensic examiners who had at least a year of experience 
were interviewed, as it would be impractical to speak with mobile forensic examiners 
who lack real experience in the field. This also created some limitations and bias because 
individuals with less than a year of experience could still potentially have provided 
valuable information. These limitations and biases were addressed by having a mix of 
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individuals participate who were randomly selected via social media and had different 
backgrounds in the field.  
Significance 
This study helped fill in gaps regarding many issues law enforcement and mobile 
forensic examiners face when dealing with national security and privacy. Most federal 
law enforcement depend on evidence found on individuals’ personal devices when 
conducting investigations. With the current issue of security and privacy overlapping one 
another, there must be clear standards in order to protect everyone involved. Focusing on 
barriers that come along with mobile forensics and privacy, this study will afford policy 
makers the opportunity to see, understand, and address these barriers that law 
enforcement investigators feel could hinder them from conducting mobile forensic 
investigations and still maintain privacy for individuals. This research study contributed 
to discussions regarding technology companies and law enforcement concerning building 
back doors to mobile devices, especially when national security may be of concern.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed the purpose and background of this study, while also 
acknowledging a gap in research concerning digital forensics. While addressing this gap, 
I also address the limitations that the study may face. The assumption that mobile 
forensics was one of the most important aspects of criminal investigation was also 
discussed. Definitions of terminology used throughout research were listed In Chapter 2, 
I address mobile forensics and the process of conducting examinations along with 
previous laws that have been established concerning privacy and electronic devices. I will 
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also discuss relevant research studies concerning issues technology companies and 
forensic examiners face dealing with encryption methods.   
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Introduction 
This study will provide a deeper understanding of participants’ perceptions based 
on previous issues concerning mobile forensics in criminal investigations. There is a lack 
of research available regarding mobile forensics and encryption when it comes to 
investigations and how encryption plays a major role in examiners being able to conduct 
their examinations in a thorough and timely manner. Information was compiled from 
sources such as legal documents, news articles, and interviews with professionals in the 
field.  
These sources focused on experiences individuals had, or situations that 
happened. According to Moustakas (1994), “phenomenology is focused less on the 
interpretations of the researcher and more on a description of the experiences of 
participants” (p. 165). Using the phenomenology theory, I was able to gain understanding 
of the concerns forensic examiners have when attempting to conduct their investigations 
in a timely manner. Thanh and Thanh (2015) said researchers who use the interpretivist 
paradigm and qualitative methods often seek experiences, understandings, and 
perceptions of individuals for their data to uncover reality rather than rely on numbers or 
statistics. 
While the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of why privacy 
and mobile forensics can sometimes cause concerns for individuals, this study also 
involves different aspects of mobile forensics and privacy rights. Along with researching 
mobile forensics, this study also addressed different aspects of forensics such as digital 
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evidence. Using the Fourth Amendment and notable Supreme Court cases, this chapter 
includes information regarding how mobile forensics is becoming a gray area that will 
eventually need to be addressed as the field is continues to grow and expand.  
Criminal investigations are constantly being subverted by digital evidence and 
anything digital can store evidence within it. This has created an unprecedented issue in 
the criminal justice and law enforcement fields, especially when it relates to mobile and 
smartphones. As these devices continue to advance, individuals’ privacy continues to be 
discussed. 
Interpretivism  
When considering research on the perception of mobile forensics examiners, 
utilizing an interpretivist philosophy would be ideal. Dudovskiy (n.d.) said interpretivism 
is “associated with the philosophical position of idealism, and is used to group together 
diverse approaches, including phenomenology; an approach that reject the objectivist 
view that meaning resides within the world independently of consciousness” (Dudovskiy, 
n.d, as cited in Collins, 2010). When discussing individuals’ privacy, it can often be a 
very subjective matter, and views can often be based off individuals’ perceptions of 
situations.  
Mobile Phones 
Mobile phones, smartphones, and PDAs have increased among individuals 
throughout the world. According to Tamma et al. (2018), “the number of mobile phones 
users in the world was expected to surpass 5 billion in 2019” (p. 8). Mobile phones are 
used during individuals’ everyday lives for paying bills, taking pictures, and calendar 
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appointments. e This has led to individual personal lives being documented within their 
phones either internally or externally via social media sites.  
The Samsung Galaxy and iPhone are two of the most popular smartphone devices 
available in the mobile phone market. These devices come with unique platforms that 
usually help users determine which one best fit their needs. Android operating systems 
occupy over 80% of mobile devices markets based on 2017 statistics, with iOS second 
(Mikhaylov, 2017). This could be because of Android's user-friendly interface that allows 
the user to control everything their phone does, unlike its competitor Apple iOS.  
Freedom of control in terms of Android and Apple devices tend to play a notable 
role when it comes to security and privacy. Security and privacy are two factors that lead 
to debates between users of devices and individuals who manufacture the devices along 
with forensic examiners in the digital forensic field. Data can be stored on mobile devices 
that can become vulnerable to hacking (Au et al., 2017). Mobile devices are becoming 
smarter, with every newly updated release model boasting better security and privacy 
encryption.  
Privacy 
Individuals tend to define privacy differently based on what they consider private 
or not. Protecting data on smartphones and privacy has been an important topic for many 
years. While technology companies pride themselves on protecting their consumers’ data 
from law enforcement, this has been debated and questioned.  Newman (2012) said law 
enforcement has continued to decry that smartphone encryption methods hinder their 
investigations, which can potentially lead to national security concerns.  
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Smartphones now have a multitude of protection layers to disrupt any 
unwarranted access to devices without proper passcodes. While iOS has infrastructure in 
place for hierarchical encryption protection, much of it is unused and operation systems 
do not extend encryption protections as far as it could (Newman, 2021). According to 
Newman (2021), 
When an iPhone has been off and boots up, all the data is in a state Apple calls 
complete protection. The user must unlock the device before anything else can 
really happen, and the device's privacy protections are very high. You could still 
be forced to unlock your phone, of course, but existing forensic tools would 
have a difficult time pulling any readable data off it. Once you have unlocked 
your phone that first time after reboot, though, a lot of data moves into a 
different mode—Apple calls it Protected Until First User Authentication, but 
researchers often simply call it “After First Unlock. (para. 7) 
There is a concern because individuals do not tend to reboot their devices very 
often, which means that most devices will be in a state after first unlock more often 
than completely protected.  
Everything done on a smartphone can lead to some type of privacy concern. For 
example, taking a picture leaves geotagging information, which gives out the location 
where that picture was taken. Making phone calls or using short messaging services 
(SMS) involves cell towers which give locations determining where calls or SMS were 
sent from. Using global positioning services (GPS) gives away individuals’ real time 
positions along with where they may have been in the past. Wi-fi connections also give 
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individual locations away. Different functions mobile smartphones devices offer can 
cause security and privacy concerns for users.  
Not only can these concerns be exploited by criminals and hackers, but also law 
enforcement can use these devices to help them solve criminal cases, which has now 
become the norm in criminal investigations. Smartphones are one of the most sought-
after digital pieces of evidence law enforcement looks for when a crime has taken place, 
because of all the information they can retrieve from them, without even questioning the 
suspected individuals. According to Tamma et al. (2018), modern mobile platforms 
contain built-in security features to protect user data and privacy. These built-in security 
features continue to be upgraded with each device or software patch released. With each 
upgrade, there still lacks specific laws that govern digital forensics, which leaves 
investigators to rely on precedent cases and predetermined laws. 
Legal Laws 
Fourth Amendment 
 The Fourth Amendment has been debated in courts for decades and will continue 
to be debated as interpretation will always be an issue when dealing with individuals' 
rights. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) is where the courts originally held 
that the Fourth Amendment protection would be triggered whenever the government 
invaded a citizen's reasonable expectation of privacy. This case followed the previous 
Supreme Court Trespass Doctrine, where they held that trespass onto a defendant’s 
property was not enough to warrant Fourth Amendment protection in 1924 (Miraldi, 
1977, p. 710). 
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 The Trespass Doctrine was based on physical contact with an individual and/or 
their property. This, however, would need to be expanded on because emerging 
technology that law enforcement were beginning to utilize in order to circumvent having 
to physically be on someone property to collect evidence.  
United States v. New York Telephone Company 
United States v. New York Telephone Company 434 U.S. 159 (1977) allowed law 
enforcement get court orders facing telephone companies to install pen registers to record 
phone numbers dialed on a certain device. The court said that requiring the telephone 
companies help law enforcement with pen registers would not affect their business 
operations, as they currently use the method for themselves regularly. This is one of the 
many cases that the FBI cited in their fight with Apple in 2016.  
Kyllo v. United States 
Kyllo v. United States 533 U.S. 27 (2001) case revolves around whether the use of 
a thermal-imaging device aimed at a private home from a public street to detect relative 
amounts of heat within the home constitutes a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment. In simpler terms, the question the case seeked to answer in general was if 
the use of technology enhancement tools invaded and/or trespassed on individuals rights 
within the Fourth Amendment. The government claimed that use of technology should 
not be considered a search since they did not physically access the defendants’ property. 
Kyllo, the defendant in the case argued that the government did in fact invade his 
Fourth Amendment rights by utilizing invasive technology not readily available to the 
public to look inside his dwelling unlawfully. This is not the first time a case like this has 
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been heard in front of the U.S. Supreme Court. “Courts have approved warrantless visual 
surveillance of a home, see California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213, ruling that visual 
observation is no “search” at all, see Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 
234—235, 239” in the past (Kyllo v United States 533 U.S. (2001)).  
Utilizing precedence from the cases mentioned above, the government argued that 
they did not in fact invade Kyllo Fourth Amendment rights because they only utilized 
visual observation. This, however, was not the stance of the Supreme court almost 15 
years later. The Supreme court held that use of advanced technology from a public 
location inside a private residence was considered a search within the Fourth Amendment 
in therefore unlawfully without a warrant. 
This holding however still left a lot of questions on the table regarding advanced 
technology. After this case, there still lacked a significant articulation on exactly “when 
technology has crossed the line from a new technology, unavailable in law enforcement 
searches without a warrant, to existing technology in general public use that courts may 
not now consider a search at all under the Fourth Amendment” (Adkins, 2002, p. 245-
267). This has left room for future cases as technology has and will continue to advance, 
as seen in the Riley v. California case where a smartphone now became the technology 
being utilized to collect evidence. 
Along with mobile phone companies such as Apple and Samsung utilizing 
encryption methods to protect their customers' privacy, the fourth amendment also helps 
protect citizens from the government (law enforcement) by not allowing them to search 
or seize digital evidence without the proper authority. The unlawful search and seizure of 
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digital evidence, especially searching has played a major role in national cases regarding 
digital evidence. There have been numerous times where law enforcement may have 
sought out to search an individual's personal device, however needed that individual to 
unlock such device because they either did not have proper authority to search the device 
legally using forensic methods and their forensic methods failed to unlock the device.  
 Research has shown in the past that law enforcement agencies are willing to do 
just about anything to retrieve valuable information they believe is located on digital 
evidence. For example, a case where the FBI forced an individual to unlock their Apple 
iPhone X utilizing face recognition (Brewster, 2018). This as anyone can imagine caused 
a lot of outcry from the public as it was seen to be disregarding the individual’s 4th and 
5th amendment rights. According to Fred Jennings, a senior associate at Tor Ekeland 
Law “the law is not well formed to provide the intuitive protections people think about 
when they're using a Face ID unlock,” (Brewster, 2018). Utilizing intrusive methods to 
gain access to pertinent information without physically trespassing on individual’s 
property has been debated for decades. Cases such as this have come up more and more 
often with technology continuing to advance. 
Riley v. California 
Riley v. California 573 U.S _ (2014) was one of the most notorious Supreme 
Court Cases dealing with electronic evidence and privacy. This case also revolves around 
the Fourth Amendment and law enforcement authority to perform warrantless searches 
on individuals cell phones at the time of an arrest. Riley, the defendant in this case, 
accused the San Diego Police Department of violating his privacy rights when handing 
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his personal property and technology. The courts were tasked with deciding two different 
things within this case: 
1. Whether the Fourth Amendment permits police officers to conduct a 
warrantless search of the digital contents of an individual cell phone, and 
2. If so, under what circumstances do they have this authority (Bensur and 
Brokamp, n.d.). 
Two of the key factors weighed for this case was the issue of privacy versus 
safety. There has been very limited case law dealing with the matter in the digital age 
before this case. When cellphones (smartphones) become more and more a part of 
individuals lives, the amount of information on these devices are becoming unlimited 
access to individuals' livelihoods. Most smartphones nowadays have the same capabilities 
of computers and why the authority to search someone's computers only comes with a 
warrant, smartphones have not been properly addressed yet concerning the matter. There 
have been numerous arguments from groups all around the United States pleading for 
action to be taken on the matter, however this case was one of the first times the U.S. 
Supreme Court decided to address the issue.  
Law enforcement sees issues with having to obtain a warrant when dealing with 
smartphones, citing officer safety issues in this case. Per California, smartphones can be 
rigged to detonate remotely or explode when a specific action is carried out on the phone 
while in the owner’s possession (Bensur and Brokamp, n.d.). This concern has become 
very apparent throughout the world with the amount of terrorism that has evolved 
“Improvised Explosive Devices'' (IED), i.e., the Boston Marathon Bombing the year prior 
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to this case. Another concern for law enforcement is the possibility of individuals being 
able to delete valuable information or evidence if they are not able to confiscate the 
devices without a warrant. They also argued that the same information that can be found 
on smartphones can also be found on pieces of paper, in photographs, in wallets and 
purses, there is no difference between them searching that information incident to arrest 
(Bensur and Brokamp, n.d.). The only difference law enforcement sees in the evidence is 
the form of which it is stored. 
After going over all evidence presented during previous trials and cases, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held that law enforcement would need a warrant to search individuals' 
smartphone search incident to arrest. The following was concluded: 
Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an 
arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee’s escape. Law enforcement officers 
remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be 
used as a weapon—say, to determine whether there is a razor blade hidden 
between the phone and its case. Once an officer has secured a phone and 
eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can 
endanger no one. (Riley v California, US 537 (2014))  
This decision has set a precedent for future cases to come concerning the digital 
age and world we live in. 
FBI v. Apple 
 In December 2015, the attack in San Bernardino, CA created a very important 
discussion regarding national security and individual’s privacy rights between the FBI 
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and Apple. The dispute arose from an application that the FBI filed in a federal 
magistrate court in California, looking for assistance in the search of an iPhone that was 
seized from the attack in San Bernardino (EPIC, n.d). This device was originally owned 
by the San Bernardino Health Department but utilized by the suspect in the 2015 attack. 
The FBI had tried to unlock the iPhone 5c device themselves with no luck and reached 
out to the National Security Agency (NSA) for assistance, however they too said they 
could not access the device.  
 The application the FBI filed in court asked for Apple to be compelled to create a 
backdoor for the device for them to gain access to the data located within it. According to 
the San Bernardino District Attorney on the case, “the phone may house a “dormant 
cyber pathogen” that threatens the county” (Russell, 2016). The application under the 
All-Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651, was granted, however Apple pushed back on the 
decision, calling it unlawful and unconstitutional. After being granted their order, the FBI 
got the documents unsealed and notified the press of its request of Apple to assist with 
the case, however Tim Cook, Apple CEO released a letter to his customers stating he 
would oppose the order (EPIC, n.d.). 
 When Apple fought back by filling their own court orders asking to not be 
compelled to the previous order because of the precedent it could set, the courts began to 
take another look at the issues. During this time, the FBI was still trying to different ways 
gain access to the device without Apple helps. They eventually found a third-party 
company that was able to gain access to the device and dropped the court order on Apple 
for the time being. It has been discussed that the Israeli company Cellebrite help the FBI, 
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however the FBI has repeatedly denied this accusation to the public and instead have 
utilized hackers to create zero-day vulnerability to bypass its ten-try limitation access.  
 In January 2020, FBI was once again going to go back to court with Apple over 
the December 2019 shooting at the Naval Air Station in Pensacola, FL. Just like the San 
Bernardino iPhone access issue, the FBI once again was having problems gaining access 
to the suspects device in Pensacola. Apple again fought back stating that “it’s not about 
the phones — it’s about a year’s long push by the Department of Justice for broader 
government oversight of mobile technology” (Caballero-Reynolds, 2020). This push has 
continuously affected the world of digital forensics/mobile forensics.  
Digital Forensics 
 Digital forensics has become one of the most complex sciences within the 
forensic field all together. It has branched off too many different fields that all come with 
their own complexity to them. When thinking about the field of digital forensics, most 
individuals are more aware of computer forensics as this was the biggest aspects of the 
digital forensics when it first came about. Computers, however, have become just one 
aspect of the field, that now consist of “any devices that store data. “Computers, laptops, 
smartphones, thumb drives, memory cards external hard drives are within the ambit of 
digital forensics” (Singh & Kent, 2018). 
Other pieces of digital evidence that may not be as obvious to some would be 
game consoles, fit bits, IoT devices and smart tv’s. All these devices can potentially hold 
some type of evidence for a case that could help solve a crime. 
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Examiners who work in the field must have special skills sets that they must keep 
up to date regularly as things change so frequent. They also must familiarize themselves 
with the many tools that are available to them. These tools can consist of Magnet 
Forensics, Cellebrite, Oxygen, GrayKey Blackbag and Encase and plenty more. 
All these tools serve their purpose in the digital forensic field; however, the most 
common tools law enforcement tend to utilize for mobile forensic would be Cellebrite 
and GrayKey.  
Cellebrite 
 Cellebrite is one of the most common mobile forensic tools available to digital 
forensic examiners. Originally it was created in 1999 for wireless carriers to be able to 
transfer data from one cellular device to another for its customers. These companies still 
utilize the tool for this method today, while examiners use it for investigations. In 2007 
however, the company decided to expand into the digital forensic field by creating the 
Universal Forensic Extraction Device (UFED), to help mobile forensics examiners 
extract data off devices that were encrypted. 
 UFED’s can be found in just about all local police stations along with their patrol 
cars now days, as it has become the go to method for law enforcement when acquiring 
get data from mobile devices. It is a very technology friendly tool that doesn’t call for 
individuals to be experts at mobile forensics, as a lot of times they can just plug the 
device in and follow the instructions on the device and retrieve the information they are 




GrayKey is one of the most sought-after mobile forensics tools created by the 
company GrayShift, that is only available to law enforcement and some government 
entities. This has called a lot of frustration within the mobile forensic field, as examiners 
with private companies would also like to utilize the tool, however, are not afforded the 
same opportunities. Defense attorneys run into this issue a lot as they are also not allowed 
to utilize the tool but have to defend their client from evidence, they are not completely 
sure how it was retrieved. According to GrayShift, “only GrayKey can provide lawful 
same-day access to the latest iOS devices in less than one hour” (GrayShift, n.d.). 
Figure 1 
 




 To a lot of mobile forensic examiners and defense attorneys, not having access to 
tools like GrayKey completely limits their investigations, as this tool has the ability to 
access a lot of iOS devices that other tools don’t. Mobile phones are an essential piece of 
digital evidence and not having access to one of the best forensic tools, limits certain 
investigators during investigations.  
Digital Evidence 
According to the National Institute of Justice (2016), “digital evidence is 
information stored or transmitted in binary form that may be relied on in court” (para, 2). 
In recent years, more and more crimes have been committed utilizing electronics such as 
computer hard drives, personal digital assistants (PDA), flash cards in digital cameras and 
smartphones to name a few. These crimes leave behind digital evidence that law 
enforcement have begun to use in order to solve these same crimes. Most Law 
Enforcement agencies today have specialty units that constantly work and train on how to 
gather digital evidence without altering it.  
The collection of digital evidence is one of the most crucial steps in an 
investigation, as if not collected proper it can potentially affect the data located on the 
devices. In the past when computer was the main digital evidence being collected for 
investigations, there was only one rule, “pull the plug”. This allowed for the examiners to 
ensure no data would be alter, however they did not account for the data that was going to 
be lost by just pulling the plug. This eventually led to investigators collecting live digital 
evidence. With smartphones, it can sometimes be a little more complex, however.  
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With smartphones being minicomputers basically, investigators not only have to 
be concerned with alter and/or losing some data. They also have to be cautions of 
individuals being able to remotely wiping data off devices along with completely locking 
the devices with too many incorrect passcode attempts. One method that is commonly 
utilized throughout the digital collection field is “if the phone is on, photograph the 
screen and place it in a Faraday bag, aluminum foil or signal-blocking container. This 
will prevent a third party from connecting to the phone and being able to alter what's on 
it” (Kuzia, 2013). 
While digital evidence such as smartphones are sometimes considered the ideal 
piece of evidence in criminal cases, just retrieving a mobile phone does not make a 
criminal case any easier to solve. There are significant delays when it deals with 
conducting forensic on digital evidence. According to Hitchcock, Le-Khac and Scanlon 
(2016), “A significant bottleneck during an investigation involving digital evidence is the 
time delay from digital evidence being sent to a specialist Technological Crime Unit 
(TCU) and the assignment to a forensic analyst to complete the necessary in-depth 
analysis and reporting”. These delays can cause an even more significant issue when the 
need for the information on the devices are needed for a pertinent investigation. Another 
reason behind a lot of delays even after the devices reach the appropriate individuals is 
the amount of security located on the device itself. 
With mobile phones, especially smartphones, comes the difficulty of getting past 
those built-in security measures on the phone to be able to look at potential evidence. 
Smartphones are constantly being upgraded with new features and security measures with 
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the consumers privacy in mind and no regard to the digital forensic investigators. This in 
some cases can become an even bigger issue when presented in court as evidence as 
forensic examiners must ensure not to alter any data on the devices during an 
investigation. This is where the term mobile forensics plays comes to light.  
Encryption 
Encryption has been around for decades and has been utilized to protect sensitive 
data from individuals who shouldn’t have access to it. According to Loshin and Cobb, 
there are three different aspects of encryption to include: the data, the encryption engine, 
and the key management (para. 7, 2020). Key management is very important aspects to 
encryption because if not managed properly, the key could be easily retrievable, making 
the encryption useless.  
Technology companies have taking encryption to an entirely different level, 
forcing the field digital forensics, especially mobile forensic to stay up to date on the 
methods. “Governments and law enforcement officials around the world, particularly in 
the Five Eyes (FVEY) intelligence alliance, continue to push for encryption backdoors, 
which they claim are necessary in the interests of national safety and security as criminals 
and terrorists increasingly communicate via encrypted online services” (Loshin & Cobb, 
2020). This is an ongoing battle with technology companies, such as Apple, that has not 
seen any real progress and has been described as stalemate in the past by U.S. leaders. 
Mobile Forensics 
Mobile forensics, while relatively unique, is one of the fastest growing digital 
forensics fields being utilized these days. When dealing with criminal investigations, it 
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has become very rare to have a case that doesn’t consist of some sort of digital forensics 
with smartphones being one of the most useful pieces of evidence to have. With this 
evidence comes multiple different processes that should be followed unless the evidence 
will be considered tainted in a court of law.  
According to Tamma et al. (2018) mobile forensics is one aspect of digital 
forensics that can be broken down into three categories to include: seizure/preservation, 
acquisition, and examination/analysis.  
Each of these categories serve as an important step in the proper handling of 
digital evidence when conducting criminal cases. There is also an additional category, 
which is often referred to as the reporting phase where the forensic examiner sums up all 
their findings in most often a word document. Below shows a limited graph on the 
sequence of the different phases of mobile forensics: 
Figure 2 
Mobile Forensic Investigation Process 
 
Seizure/Preservation 
 Seizure of digital evidence can be one of the most important parts of a criminal 
case. For law enforcement to first be able to collect/seize digital evidence, they must first 
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have the proper authority i.e., warrant which can be obtained by a Judge. There are 
different types of warrants that can be obtained but the most important part of the warrant 
is where it explains exactly what law enforcement can search and seize as defined within 
the 4th Amendment. Once digital evidence is seized, it is the responsibility of the 
investigators to ensure that it is properly preserved before, during and after the 
investigation.  
 Preservation of evidence plays a significant role especially when concerning 
privacy. Digital evidence, especially smartphones can hold an enormous amount of 
personal information about the owner of the device and if left in the wrong hands that 
information has the potential of being leaked/exposed. According to Englebrecht et al. 
(2019) “digital evidence must be stored in such a way that it is secure from unauthorized 
access by third parties and retains its original condition”. This can become an issue as the 
focus of the criminal investigation should only focus on certain things, however with 
digital evidence individuals tend to have to hand over their entire device and not just text 
messages or photos stored on the phone.  Having to relinquish an entire device gives 
investigators the opportunity to acquire everything within the device during what is called 
the acquisition of the device, which can be done multiple different days.  
Acquisition 
 The acquisition phase of mobile forensics can be broken down into three different 
forensic methods, which all come with a unique advantage and disadvantage. With most 
users having some sort of security function enabled on their device, whether it be face 
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recognition, pins or passwords, forensics investigators typically must find ways to bypass 




 Post-Mortem Forensics is typically used throughout investigations to extract data 
off devices. Forensic investigators often prefer to get what is called a physical extraction 
as it affords them more data than a logical extraction.  According to Krishnan et al.  
(2019), physical extraction methods like Hex Dumping, Joint Test Action Group (JTAG), 
Chip-Off and Micro Read allow for a more direct access to the raw information stored on 
the smartphone device flash memory. This type of access has the potential to take hours 
to finish, which the investigator typically has no control over. The investigator also has 
no control over if the data extraction completely grabs all the necessary data and this will 
not be known until the extraction is completed, as there is no ability to check while the 
extraction is taking place. This in turn leaves it up to the actual examination of data to 




Examining data after a data extraction is completed can be done in a variety of 
ways, however this can have its disadvantages. According to Krishnan et al. (2019), there 
still lacks any global standardization regarding forensic processes and the only 
framework that lists any type of requirements to be met is the “Smartphone Tool 
Specifications Standard” developed by NIST. Having standardized guidelines established 
would make the digital field more comprehensive to the courts. This can be difficult 
however, as with most things’ technology, it is an ever-changing field that is constantly 
evolving and forcing examiners to continue to find new ways to conduct forensic.  
During the examination stage of a mobile/smartphone, investigators must first 
check to ensure that the data collected was not corrupted during the acquisition phase. 
This is typically done by making sure there are no blank sectors of data, which is usually 
identified by the forensic tool utilized to acquire the data. Investigators also need to 
ensure they are conducting their examination of the data with the acquired copy of the 
image and not the original.  
Depending on the type of investigation the examiner is working on, they tend to 
tailor what they look for during the examination. If examiners were to look at every piece 
of data located on the phone, it would take them weeks, sometimes months to go through 
everything. Forensic tools such as Oxygen have the capability to collect a lot of different 
information that examiners tend to look at. This information can include, but is not 
limited to Device Information, Contacts, Call Logs (Missed/Outgoing/Incoming Calls), 
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Organizer Data (Memos/Tasks/Notes), SMS, MMS, E-Mails, Photos, Videos, Audio and 
video files, and Deleted Data (Jones & Winster, 2017) 
 This phase is where privacy becomes an issue for a lot of individuals. As forensic 
examiners, they have access to everything that is within the phone and this is not 
comforting for individuals. While examiners may be looking for one thing on a device it 
is not uncommon for them to find others incriminating or personal information about the 
device owner. It has been said numerous times that smartphones are an extension of 
someone's life. According to Nijssen, Schaap and Verheijen (2018), “we rely on our 
digital devices for doing our jobs, maintaining friendships, navigating traffic, or relaxing 
after work, and our physical and emotional attachment to them has deepened 
accordingly”. 
 This information is not something that individuals would likely like to share with 
forensic examiners, however it is information that examiners would find useful. This is 
where the corporations such as Apple and Samsung play a significant role in 
security/privacy. Apple prides itself on its ability to protect its consumers privacy from 
unwanted parties. Apple Inc, (2021) states the follow on their website:  
Apple believes privacy is a fundamental human right and has numerous built-in 
controls and options that allow users to decide how and when apps use their 
information, as well as what information is being used. Your devices are 
important to so many parts of your life. What you share from those experiences, 
and who you share it with, should be up to you. We design Apple products to 
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protect your privacy and give you control over your information. It’s not always 
easy. But that’s the kind of innovation we believe in. (para, 1) 
This statement looks to be in line with their reaction in 2016 with the U.S 
Government. The FBI requested them to unlock or build a backdoor to the iPhone of the 
San Bernardino shooter and they refused. In an open letter to their customers, Cook 
(2016) said “The United States government has demanded that Apple take an 
unprecedented step which threatens the security of our customers. We oppose this order, 
which has implications far beyond the legal case at hand” (para, 1).  
With the security measures Apple had in place on that device, forensic examiners 
within the FBI, were having a difficult time acquiring the data on the phone and wanted 
the company to bypass the security features for them. This would have allowed the 
examiners the opportunity to conduct an examination/analysis on the device to help build 
a case against the shooter in San Bernardino. Without Apple's help getting into the 
device, the FBI worried that there may have been information on the device that would 
possibly detail another criminal act being planned.  
Apple and the FBI are seemingly at odds again with the technology company 
refusing again to create a backdoor for the law enforcement agency to get into the iPhone 
of the excused mass shooter in Pensacola, Fl at the Naval Air Station. The United States 
Attorney General publicly asked Apple to help with the unlocking of the device, while 
Apple declined and instead assembled a team of advisers to defend their encryption 




Issues such as these will continue to arise when dealing with digital forensics, 
privacy, law enforcement and technology corporations. Technology corporations 
continue to expand and upgrade their security features for their consumers; however, this 
makes the job of a forensic examiner harder daily. Once a forensic tool is developed to 
bypass one security feature, another security feature is developed to withstand that 
forensic tool. This is an ongoing battle that appears to have no end in sight and examiners 
must continue to if not stay ahead of security measures, or at least be up to date with 
them. If not, their reports are going to be filled with failed attempts at acquiring 
smartphone data for investigations along with battling technology corporations for help.  
Reporting 
The report of a digital forensic investigation is one of the most important aspects 
of the investigation. This is where the examiner explains all the methods utilized 
throughout the process, how they acquired the data and exactly what data was found on 
the devices. This report must explain the exact forensically sound investigation methods 
used for the information found to be used in a court of law. This can sometimes fall short 
of explaining the forensically sound methods used however, when it comes to law 
enforcement and their use of the GrayKey tool. As mentioned previously, this tool is not 
widely available, and its exact capabilities are kept amongst those who are allowed to 
utilize the tool.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed the Fourth Amendment which is one of the most 
important aspect to citizens and the government when it deals with the right to privacy. 
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Building off Fourth Amendments foundation of privacy, I looked at previous case law 
where the Courts were forced to step in and make decisions concerning the use of 
advance technology. Their decision often left room for more discussion because law 
enforcement methods continued to advance along with technology and prior law left 
room for interpretation on the issue. It was also discussed within this chapter the daily 
task and frustrations forensic examiners face while trying to conduct their jobs.  
I looked at the different types of digital evidence that can acquired, while also 
discussing the tools used to acquire such evidence during investigations. Regarding tools 
used, I talked about how the forensic tool GrayKey can only be access by law 
enforcement and some government entities. This often can hinder others from conducting 
complete investigations or defending their clients in court.  
From researched literature utilized within this chapter, it appeared to be a 
common theme that forensic examiners were struggling to keep up with the technology 
companies regarding encryption and it appears that no one knows how to approach the 
issue. These themes are in line with other research studies that utilized the 
phenomenology theory to gain insight to participants perceptions. As mentioned by 
Miner-Romanoff (2012), Husserl theory can be underutilized when it comes to crime and 
this research study seeks to clarify why it can be useful. 
Using Walden University Library, Google Scholar and Lexis Nexis, I was able to 
find articles, papers, and court documents by using key search terms. These key terms 
enabled me to find information regarding struggles forensic examiners are facing. This 
study will address that issue via interviews with individuals on this topic.   
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Chapter 3: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter includes the methodology that was utilized to understand the 
perceptions of mobile forensic investigators concerning, privacy rights, encryptions, and 
national security. I will also discuss the methods used to collect and analyzed the data 
from the research conducted.  
Interviews of participants involve how important they feel privacy and national 
security can or cannot coexist together, and if so, the complications involved with this 
coexistence. Participants were asked to sign consent forms and sit down for one-on-one 
interviews and/or focus groups to discuss the topic. They also filled out outside activity 
forms, which is an internal form required by my agency to conduct interviews with 
individuals I work with. 
Research Design 
 This study was conducted as a qualitative study, which allowed for perceptions of 
mobile forensic investigators regarding privacy of individuals to be explored. Using the 
phenomenology theory, this study filled in gaps regarding a subject that had not been 
thoroughly discussed. This allowed participants to be able to give their opinions in a 
manner that was thoroughly evaluated.  
Role of the Researcher  
 For this case study, I was the sole researcher and data collector. I was responsible 
for finding all participants, along with setting up the one-on-one interviews with these 
individuals. Along with conducting interviews, I created a list of questions each 
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participant was asked and the order they were asked in. This consisted of open-ended 
questions that were used throughout the interview. Ensuring that any form of bias on my 
part was properly addressed and avoiding objectivity was also my responsibility, as I am 
currently a digital forensic examiner and may potentially have to interview individuals I 
know. 
According to Varga-Dobai (2012), objectivity implies that the researcher can 
distance themselves from subjects observed during the process of research while ensuring 
delivering questions in a neutral way without influencing participants. Varga-Dobai said 
the researcher “enters the research arena with no ax to grind, no theory to prove, and no 
predetermined results to support” (p. 1-17). 
In order to ensure confirmability throughout the study, participants’ engagement 
throughout the study was thoroughly documented to allow for objectivity to be addressed. 
Each participant received the same emails, documents, and access to interview 
transcriptions throughout the entire process.  
Research Questions 
The following questions were used:  
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations? 
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile 
forensic investigators concerning privacy rights? 
Sampling of Participants 
I used the phenomenology theory, and it was imperative that I interviewed 
individuals who had working knowledge of the topic. These individuals include former 
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law enforcement members, digital forensic examiners, and attorneys in digital forensics. 
This selection process is typically called purposive sampling, which is described as 
selecting individuals who have experience or qualifications with the phenomenon under 
investigation (Creswell, 2005, p. 204). The goal was to interview 10 individuals, as it 
became difficult to schedule interviews with individuals who work busy schedules and 
lacked free time to participate in interviews. As it became difficult to recruit individuals 
within the law enforcement filed, especially from the FBI, I expanded my research to 
forensic examiners in general to find available and willing participants. 
Data Collection 
 Sources of data for this study were phone and video interviews during times that 
were agreed upon by me and participants who willingly participated in the research study. 
The recording device that was used was checked before each interview to ensure it was 
working properly. If the recording device was found to not be working properly, a spare 
was available. If for any reason the spare recording device malfunctioned, I would take 
notes manually by hand, as myself and the participant would potentially not want to 
reschedule the interview for a later date. This would ensure the process ran as smoothly 
as possible. When conducting these interviews, it was imperative to ensure participants 
felt comfortable throughout the entire interview process and research study. According to 
Rubin and Rubin (2005), making sure to have a welcoming atmosphere, open dialogue, 
not imposing perspectives or opinions during conversations, and maintaining flexibility 
in terms of the flow of interviews are very important.  
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Interviews started with participants and me going over the informed consent form 
that was previously emailed to them. This form outlined reasons for the study, what the 
study will be used for, who had access to the study, and how their opinions would be 
relayed. Each participant was given the option to maintain complete anonymity to protect 
their privacy, as their opinions could have the potential to affect their work lives. 
Participants were also once again informed during any point throughout the interview, if 
they felt uncomfortable to let me know, and we could discuss whether it would be best 
for them to withdraw from the study. After going over the consent form, participants 
were given the option to engage in small talk to help open the conversation in a relaxing 
manner.  
Each interview was expected to last no longer than one hour from start to finish, 
including time after for questions and summarizing discussions, which was more than 
enough time. This helped ensure that all information collected was correct and there were 
no misunderstood questions. During the summary, participants were given the 
opportunity to ask questions about the actual study that were interesting to them or came 
to their mind during the questioning stage that they did not get a chance to ask. 
All interview questions were derived from the main two research questions to 
ensure that topics were clearly aligned. Each participant was asked the same questions in 
the same order to ensure consistency throughout the study. Any follow-up questions were 
based on answers received from participants. 
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Reliability and Validity 
 When considering reliability and validity, individuals tend to connect to the terms 
to quantitative studies more than qualitative studies. Validity and reliability are two 
factors which any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a 
study, analyzing results and judging the quality of the study (Golafshani, 2003; Patton, 
2001). An important aspect of reliability and validity is to ensure to incorporate 
triangulation and member checking within this research study. 
Member checking was completed after every interview to ensure information 
interpretation was complete, by doing a quick summarize of what was discussed. This 
enabled me to limit the amount time I took from the participants, by not having to reach 
back out (unless necessary) after the interviews were completed. As mentioned earlier 
within this chapter the participants may have very limited time to participate, so ensuring 
to get all information and clarification at the same time is imperative. Triangulation was 
accomplished by interviewing two different forensic examiners groups. This will ensure 
to keep my professional beliefs of the topic at bay as participants will have different 
backgrounds on the topic. 
Data Analysis 
 Data was analyzed by me utilizing narrative analysis. Narrative analysis captures 
personal and human dimensions of experience over time and takes account of the 
relationship between individual experience and cultural context (WordPress, n.d, para, 1). 
Taking in account participants personal experiences and cultural context regarding the 
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research topic allowed for the data to be thoroughly comprehended. Ensuring data was 
comprehended correctly, recordings from the interviews were transcribed.  
Transcription was completed by me to save on time and money, as transcribing 
became very costly to get it done professional. This however did make the process a little 
slower.  “At first glance, it might appear that capturing what is said on paper is a 
straightforward task, however even fairly ‘accurate’ ones, can be misleading” (Hepburn 
& Bolden, 2017). After the transcribing of the data, the analysis of the transcribes was 
thoroughly considered for the most important data to be pulled out utilizing the coding 
method. 
According to Bazeley (2007), coding is one of several methods of working with 
and building knowledge about data; used in conjunction with annotating, memoing, 
linking and modeling. Coding can be very complex depending on the data that is being 
coded, therefore it is important to completely understand the method being utilized. “Any 
researcher who wishes to become proficient at doing qualitative analysis must learn to 
code well and easily. The excellence of the research rests in large part on the excellence 
of the coding” (Strauss, 1987). In order to accomplish the coding, the Nvivo software was 
going to be utilized as it is designed for data is in word form to help with organization, 
however I later decided to complete the coding myself without the software. While 
member checking during the interview phase should clear up any discrepancies, there 
were instances when I had to get more clarification for the participants. Which was 
addressed with the individual who was interviewed.  If any discrepancies arose during 
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other phases of the research study i.e., transcribing, I was prepared to address the matter 
by officially hiring professionals.  
Ethical Protections 
Staying in line with Walden University requirements for research studies 
regarding human participant interactions, I obtained approval from the Institutional 
Review Board at Walden and from the participants who employers required it. I did end 
up interviewing an individual who worked at the same employer as me, however we have 
never interacted with each other as our employer has over thousands of workers 
worldwide. Being proactive, approval was already granted from my employer to speak 
with individuals, with the acknowledgment of paperwork that was to be filled out prior to 
any interview. Each participant was required to sign an informed consent (via email) as 
mentioned earlier and such form will be thoroughly reviewed with the participants before 
the interviews begin.  
Participants were only referenced by numbers, and job titles instead names. Also, 
their employer’s information was not mentioned within the study. After the research 
study was completed, all data is being kept for a minimum of five years within a lock safe 
at a location only accessible be myself. After the five years, data will be destroyed 
utilizing a sound method i.e., wiping the hard drive or completely degaussing it and 
shredding any physical documents that notes were written on.  
With the acknowledgment of interviewing an individual that worked for the same 
Agency as me, there stood the possibility of conflict of interest that was addressed 
appropriately from the beginning. This conflict was addressed by ensuring not to go into 
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too much detail of any particular case or situation the examiner may have dealt with, 
which alleviated the possibility of any need-to-know information being released within 
the study. 
Summary 
 Within this chapter, I discussed the methods on how the research would be 
conducted in order to gather the necessary opinions on security and privacy when it deals 
with digital forensic. The importance of my role as the researcher and how bias can play 
a negative role during the interview process. This also comes into play when deciding on 
who will participate within the research study as only a particular group would 
comprehend the subject matter. The method of how data was collected and the manner 
and how it was analyzed, was also discussed within this chapter to give a better 




Chapter 4: Results  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I summarize results acquired from participants interviewed for this 
research. Participants were all asked the same questions involving their opinions or 
previous and current experience with the topic. Research was conducted by interviewing 
10 individuals with digital forensic and specifically mobile forensic experience. These 
interviews were conducted via Zoom video chat or Microsoft Teams. Each interview was 
held at a convenient time for the participant and lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. After 
all interviews were completed, data were transcribed by me to address all relevant 
information. 
After transcriptions of interviews, summaries were sent to everyone via email. 
Participants returned their summaries with necessary changes that needed to be made 
along with any additions they wanted added to their interview via member-checking. 
After this, I analyzed data for common and uncommon themes.  
I also discuss demographics of participants within the study. Participants were 
asked specific questions that only related to them. Gender limitations were also 
mentioned as it became clear that the study would have more men than women, as 
technology careers such digital forensics are commonly dominated by men.  
Study Overview 
 The purpose of this study was to understand the issues mobile forensic 
investigators have while trying to conduct their jobs. As smartphones have continued to 
advance, encryption has also advanced. With the advancement of encryption methods, 
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forensic examiners are constantly being tasked with finding new and innovative ways to 
bypass securities features on their devices. This has led to difficult and sometimes failed 
attempts, as seen with the FBI in 2016 regarding their efforts to unlock a suspected 
shooter’s iPhone device. 
 In 2014, former director of the FBI James Comey expressed that allowing the 
government access to cell phones would enable them to catch not only criminals but also 
terrorists (Gu, 2014). The theory behind this was that by not allowing U.S. government 
agencies access to devices, no justice could be served in criminal cases. He fought this 
stance by indicating that they were not requesting backdoor but rather front door access 
to be as transparent with U.S. citizens as possible. This, however, would open 
possibilities for criminal hackers to exploit devices also.  
Participants’ opinions and experiences are expressed throughout research 
interviews to gain a better understanding of mobile forensic examiners’ perceptions of the 
issue of encryption. From data that were collected via interviews, mobile forensic 
practitioners were split on these issues, with different opinions between civilians and 
practitioners. This became even more evident with participants who had previous law 
enforcement experience, as they were looking at it from three different perspectives.  
Personal and Organizational Influences 
During the time I began to collect my data, there were different social and justice 
issues going on within the U.S. centered around law enforcement. During a world 
pandemic, law enforcement departments were continuously scrutinized by social and 
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justice groups for the way they handled situations. I believe this could have played a role 
in how participants within this study addressed certain questions during interviews. 
There were multiple times throughout interviews when social justice issues taking 
place in the U.S. were brought up as examples. This was evident when asking 
participants if they felt technology companies helping law enforcement would be seen as 
a privacy concern. Some participants used examples involving how law enforcement is 
viewed as untrustworthy as well as how technology companies’ ability protect 
individuals’ privacy rights.  
Data Analysis and Collection Procedures 
 Information provided throughout interviews, was the basis of data collected for 
the study. All participants either had some digital forensics knowledge or were digital 
forensic examiners themselves, with some knowledge and/or experience with mobile 
forensics. There were 10 participants coming from either the educational, government, or 
practitioner industries, with some law enforcement experience.  
Data were collected via Zoom and Microsoft Teams for interviews, as personal 
interviews were not feasible during the COVID-19 pandemic. Participants were giving 
multiple options to select from regarding day and time of interviews. Interviews were 
held at least once a week, depending on scheduling, as multiple interviews were 
rescheduled due to unforeseen circumstances. In total, it took about 5 months to find 
participants, receive their consent, schedule and conduct interviews, and complete 
member checks.   
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Originally, I had planned on doing one-on-one face to face interviews along with 
one focus group. This plan, however, had to be adjusted as the COVID-19 pandemic 
made it difficult to interview individuals in person and almost impossible to conduct a 
focus group. Video interviews seemed the best way to collect my data and keep everyone 
safe, and I cancelled the focus group altogether. 
Participants were all asked the same questions in the exact same order, with some 
follow-up questions based on their answers. These answers were then analyzed for 
common or uncommon themes.  
 After completion of interviews, all participants were given the opportunity to ask 
any additional questions they may have had concerning the study. If there were no 
additional questions, I explained next steps, which were that I would write up a summary 
of interviews and send them via email. This gave each participant the opportunity to look 
over their summaries and make any necessary changes. After making the changes, they 
emailed me back the updated summary.  
 With all summaries updated, I proceeded to look over them and compare any 
similarities that arose from interviews to gain a better understanding of how much 
privacy and encryption are a cause for concern with examiners. To complete this, I 
created three bins for RQ1: Encryption Problematic, Encryption not an Issue and 
Indifference. Out of the 10 participants, only one felt as if encryption was not an issue, 
while seven felt it was problematic, and two were indifferent about it. I then created two 
bins based off RQ2 concerning national security and privacy concerns: Overuse of 
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National Security and Proper Use of National Security. Two participants felt indifferent 
about overuse of national security.  
It became very clear early on after looking over summaries that there were many 
similar opinions, with some examiners using the same phrases.   
 There were also differences amongst the participants as some believed that law 
enforcement has depended on digital evidence to much lately. This opinion mostly came 
from participants who had some experience working in law enforcement. They typically 
referenced that before digital forensics became so popular, investigators in law 
enforcement knocked on doors and pulled surveillance tapes to solve crimes and this 
method worked just fine back then, cases were still solved.  
Participant Demographics 
For this research study, participants were asked to provide their demographic 





Demographic Group Information 
Participants Gender Age range Years in occupation 
1 Female 40-50 10 
2 Male 40-50 3 
3 Male 30-40 4 
4 Male 40-50 15 
5 Male 50-60 23 
6 Male 30-40 5 
7 Male 20-30 8 
8 Female 30-40 8 
9 Male 40-50 18 
10 Male 30-40 11 
 
 As seen in Table 1, participants had a very wide variety in years worked in the 
field. Some examiners were new to the field, while others have been in the filed for 
almost as long as it has existed. The age range tended to lean more towards the 40-50 
range, with only one individual being under 30 at the time of the interview. I believe with 
the variety of differences in years in the field and age, I was able to grasp a good 
understanding of how individuals feel about the state of mobile forensics.  
 There was also a clear lopsidedness when it came to gender and this study, as I 
was able to interview more men than women. The technology field tend to be dominated 
49 
 
by males, with women being like a needle in haystack. The figure below shows how the 
biggest technology companies in the United States, not only lack women in the 
organizations, but women in technology.   
Figure 4 
GAFAM: Women Still Underrepresented in Tech 
 
 With the lack of women in the technology field, I went into this study realizing 
that recruiting mobile forensic examiners would be difficult. I didn’t account for the lack 
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of women however, and only realized this issue once I began finding willing participants 
that were majority men.   
Interview Data 
Participant 1 
 Participant 1 was a practitioner/educator within the field currently and has been 
doing the digital/mobile forensic for 10 years.  
She stated that encryption on mobile devices is not that much of a concern as 
many people may believe.  Examiners have the full device in their possession 
during an investigation, which hold the keys on them. Encryption can still be a 
technically challenge those examiners must consistently overcome and have 
overcame for the past decade by thinking outside the box. It is a game of cat and 
mouse, that is to be expected in the technical field. Protecting privacy and 
allowing for legal acquisitions of content should be a partnership.  
The bigger concern would be wipe capabilities that technology these days have.  
Participant 2 
 Participant 2 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been 
doing digital/mobile forensic for 3 years.  
 Regarding whether or not law enforcement should be able to search devices 
search incident to arrest, the participant had the follow to say: 
This depends on why the individual was original stopped. There was an incident 
close to where I reside, that law enforcement pulled over a vehicle and the 
occupant of the vehicle had committed a murder and was arrested. If allowed to 
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go through the individual’s device the officers could have possible retrieved 
evidence of the murder. While I do not believe that law enforcement should be 
allowed to go through everyone’s device without probable cause, there is times I 
feel as if they should be allowed. 
 The participant also believed that current, Apple iOS devices are more difficult to 
gain access to then Googles, Android devices. Stating that Apple’s source is more 
protected then.  
Participant 3 
 Participant 3 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been 
doing digital forensic for 10 years and mobile forensic for 4 years. He has taking multiple 
courses regarding mobile forensic to include a chip off course. 
 He believed that technology companies’ encryption methods absolutely hinder 
mobile forensics. For example, with the iPhone version 4 and up, it’s almost impossible 
to get a physical capture of it. While you can jailbreak or root an Android device to 
obtain a physical dump, doing so also mean you are altering evidence, which in turns 
complicates things. He noted the following regarding the overall issues tech companies 
and law enforcement have: 
At the end of the day, there needs to be something done, some type of 
communication between mobile forensic examiners and tech companies regarding 
working to together. There should be clear an understanding between both. 
Companies such as Apple should be held accountable for not wanting to work 
with law enforcement, especially when there is an incident where there is a loss of 
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life. The news and media also play a role in such situations, as they often relay the 
message to the public that law enforcement is trying to access private information 
from devices, when in reality they are only trying to take preventative measures to 
stop incidents such as San Bernardino.  
Participant 4 
 Participant 4 worked for the government as a practitioner in the field and has been 
doing digital/mobile forensic for 15 years. He noted the following: 
Apple devices tend to be more difficult to access for mobile forensic examiners 
than Android right now regarding encryption methods. Apples are narrower 
targets, unlike Android devices. Android might have the similar base OS, but the 
implementation may be different, and examiners may just get lucky utilizing a 
random technique, unlike Apple devices which are better put together. … At the 
end of the day, this will be a losing battle for both sides, because if law 
enforcement does get technology companies to work with them, technology 
companies are going to provide an encrypted blob that law enforcement is still 
going to have issues with decrypting. As a private citizen, I have no issues with 
this because the government shouldn’t be allowed to just access my information 
when they want to.  
Participant 5 
 Participant 5 has worked in the digital forensic field for over 23 years and is a 
certified mobile forensic instructor. He has experience with teaching mobile forensic to 
law enforcement and government individuals. He noted the following: 
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Regarding tech companies helping or not helping law enforcement access 
smartphones, speaking from a private citizen perspective, tech companies have a 
duty to provide its consumers with secure devices that do not have backdoors that 
the government would be able to access. However, as a retired law enforcement 
officer, I believe tech companies should help with accessing smartphones. 
Overall, I see privacy as a big concern with big tech, as it’s being comprised for 
marketing purposes. … It would be a privacy concern for citizens if technology 
companies freely help law enforcement with their forensic investigations. Citizens 
have an expectation of privacy, and their personal data should be secured. 
Individuals are getting so attached to their smartphones that they are becoming an 
extension to themselves. I believe law enforcement is utilizing smartphones as an 
easy way of conducting investigations, instead of getting out there and 
investigating crimes now days. Before smartphones existed, crimes were being 
committed and solved, therefore they should still be able to solve crimes today 
without invading individuals’ privacy by accessing their smartphones.  
Participant 6 
 Participant 6 is an attorney for the local public defender office, who works closely 
with the mobile forensic examiners. He also has experience with testifying in court 
regarding mobile forensic. He noted the following: 
Technology companies should never help build a backdoor into encryption for 
law enforcement or anyone else, because it would be a terrible precedent to set. 
Law enforcement has failed to show how that exploit wouldn’t put the consumers 
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of that product at risk from others trying to exploit that same vulnerability. If you 
intentionally put in a backdoor, other people who you didn’t intend on walking 
through will walk through it as well. … Technology companies helping law 
enforcement during investigations will be a privacy concern, especially when 
considering exactly what the technology companies are doing to assist. I feel 
citizen have less of an argument when thinking about privacy when it comes to 
social media such as Facebook. It would be naive to believe that such companies 
are not going to turn over personal information to law enforcement if they have a 
lawful warrant. … My concern is that technology companies are less willing to 
challenge law enforcement compared to other departments. Attorneys can’t just 
subpoena information from companies like Facebook, Google etc... they are 
prevented by a Federal Law called Stored Communications Act (18 U.S.C. §§ 
2701–2712). It is antiquated law that has been used to prevent defense attorneys 
(and anyone who isn’t law enforcement) from being able to gain access to or 
copies of social media data/records, emails, etc. Also, even when requesting 
information attorneys are legally allowed to have, those same companies will 
fight tooth and nail to not provide such information but will bend over backwards 
for law enforcement. There is a little bit of imbalance when it comes to who 




 Participant 7 is a digital forensic examiner for a local/state defenders office, who 
has 6 years’ experience with mobile forensics. He noted the following regarding 
technology companies helping law enforcement: 
Coming from an examiner perspective I think it would be a privacy concern for 
the public especially for individuals who are technology educated. For example, if 
Apple decides they are going to help law enforcement 100% of the time and 
Google decide they are going to help on a case-by-case situation, most people will 
decide to utilize Google, since they are working harder to protect its consumers 
privacy rights. For your everyday person, who is not that aware of how 
technology works, I still think it would be a privacy concern also. For example, 
no one wants Facebook giving out all their information, so why would we want a 
phone manufacturer to do the same thing.  
In regard to the 4th amendment applying to individuals’ personal devices, participant 7 
expressed the following: 
The 4th amendment should apply to individual’s personal media devices just the 
same as it does to dwelling or person. Smartphones have become part of who 
individuals are now and just about everyone has one. Law enforcement shouldn’t 
be able to search a device without the proper authority, just as if they wanted to 




 Participant 8 is also a digital forensic examiner for a local/state defenders office, 
who has 8 years’ experience with mobile forensics. She noted the following: 
Technology companies’ encryption methods can hinder mobile forensic 
investigations as seen with the San Bernardino incident, where the FBI felt they 
needed Apples help but ultimately utilized a third-party company to gain access to 
the iPhone. There are two main companies (GrayShift and Cellebrite) that work to 
circumvent encryption methods on iPhones, but they are not perfect and don’t 
work on every model of every phone. Technology companies not helping is not a 
complete roadblock, but there are times where examiners can help a dead end and 
not be able to access a device and retrieve the data from it. 
He had this to say when asking about a solution to the issues between law enforcement 
and mobile forensic examiners: 
I do not believe tech companies should just blindly help law enforcement without 
a lawful court order telling them to. The same way law enforcement uses warrants 
to make companies like Apple turn over individuals iCloud backups, there should 
be no difference in them when trying to get access to the actual devices.  
Participant 9 
 Participant 9 has over 18 years of experience with not only digital forensics, but 
mobile forensics as well. He conducted mobile for forensics while working in law 
enforcement and is very familiar with the field from when it was just beginning to expand 
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beyond just computer forensics. Regarding the state of mobile forensics today and 
privacy he stated the following: 
I think it would be a privacy concern for the public. While I think law 
enforcement should be able to utilize tools at their disposal if used legally, I don’t 
think the government should be able to tell any of the big tech companies that 
they have to give them encryption keys to access their devices. There are plenty 
of examples where the government has not handled their access to data well, they 
have been breached time and time again. They do not show good cyber hygiene, 
so why would we trust them with the ability to just reach into anyone device. 
Once that backdoor is created and is breached by China, Iran, or Russia, they now 
have that ability to access those devices as well. It is a tough situation and there is 
not an easy answer.  
He also believed the following regarding limiting forensic tools from the private 
sector: 
The issue I have with the limited access to this tool is that law enforcement is 
utilizing a tool that no one else has access to and no one can articulate how the 
tool works, no one can articulate whether it is actually injecting something into 
that device for it to work correctly. There is not much worse you can do to 
someone then prosecute them, take away their civil rights and then say, we got all 
this information about you that we are going to use against you in court, but your 
defense team or defense experts cannot get access to that, and we can’t tell them 
how we did it. I do not think that’s fair, nor do I think that is the intent of our 
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constitution when it comes to the ability to present a defense. I would understand 
more if it was an intelligence specific tool.  
Participant 10 
 Participant 10 has conducting mobile forensics for 11 years, with focus on iOS 
devices. They have taken multiple courses on the topic and is considered a senior 
examiner at their organization. 
When asked specifically about whether encryption on smartphones can hinder 
investigations, he had the following to say: 
Encryption has been around for some time now and has only gotten better on 
smartphones. It can hinder an investigation, because it makes it 10 times harder to 
access devices, while back in the day it was basically plug and play. Now days, 
you must bypass so many security measures that when examiners are finally able 
to access the data on the device it may be too late for the investigation. 
When questioned about privacy and whether technology companies should work with 
law enforcement, he said the following: 
Law enforcement clearly has a job to do and anything to help them complete the 
job is great. I, however, do believe that forcing technology companies to help law 
enforcement with their investigations may be stepping over the line. If technology 
companies decided they wanted to help law enforcement, then great, but I think it 
should be the technology companies’ decision and not the governments. 
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Themes by Interview Question 
Interview Question 1 
Are you familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case Apple v. FBI? 
 All interviewees were familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case FBI v. Apple in 
some sort of way. While they all had different understanding or knowledge of the situation 
and how it related to the San Bernardino incident, the concept of the situation was able to 
be related to the research study.  
Interview Question 2 
With the FBI dropping the case, what is your take on tech companies helping or 
not helping law enforcement in such cases? 
Most interviewees felt almost the same regarding this question, while their 
reasonings may have been a little different. Majority felt as if technology companies had 
some type of duty to help law enforcement, they did not think it they should blindly help 
them whenever asked to without proper reasoning.  
Interview Question 3 
Do you believe that tech companies encryption methods, hinder mobile forensic 
investigations? 
Again, most interviewees felt as if technology companies’ encryption methods do 
hinder mobile forensic investigations, some felt it was not a complete roadblock. A 
couple also felt as this is not even the biggest issues forensic examiners have to be 
concerned about.  
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Interview Question 4 
What are your thoughts when considering law enforcement conducting mobile 
forensic examinations concerning encrypted smartphones?  
This question was a very compound question as it was elaborated into utilizing 
biometrics to unlock devices and deceased individuals right to privacy. All felt that law 
enforcement should obtain a warrant before being able to access individuals’ 
smartphones, including using biometrics. The divide regarding this amongst the 
interviewees came when considering individuals who were already deceased.  
Most seemed undecided on if they thought law enforcement should be able to use 
biometrics to unlock smartphones if the individual was deceased. The question of legality 
came up, with most not knowing what the legal guidelines where regarding deceased 
individual’s privacy rights on their mobile devices and what the courts have to say on the 
matter.  
Interview Question 5 
In your opinion, do you believe that if tech companies were to help during 
investigations, it would be a privacy concern for the public? 
Some felt as if this would be of some concern to the public but was not totaling 
against it happening. They believed that depending on the situation, some individuals 
would not mind technology companies helping during investigations, however they did 
not think it should be a normal thing for every case.  
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Interview Question 6 
Regarding social media and privacy, do you think as individuals we give our own 
privacy away? 
Everyone agreed that when it comes to social media and privacy, individuals 
completely give away so form of their privacy. There were some that felt if individual 
took an additional step to make their social media accounts private, then they could 
expect some type of privacy, but not complete from investigations.  
Interview Question 7 
Do you think national security and privacy can collide with each other? 
All felt that national security and privacy can collide with each other, while some 
felt it collide daily, hence the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act being created. It was a common theme amongst 
the participants that law enforcement can sometimes utilize national security as a crutch. 
Most felt like national security laws were too broad and needed to be looked at again.  
Interview Question 8 
Are you familiar with the verbiage used within the 4th amendment? If so, can you 
explain what it means to you? 
With a little clarification for some, the 4th amendment was understood and 
explained how it correlated to this research study.  
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Interview Question 9 
With the 4th amendment protecting individuals from unreasonable search and 
seizures, what are your thoughts when it comes to individual’s personal media 
equipment? 
All agreed that individual’s personal media equipment should apply to the 4th 
amendment with no issues. The key theme within this response was that personal media 
equipment now days hold a lot of personal information on them, and they should be 
treated the same as if law enforcement wanted to search an individual private dwelling. 
Meaning law enforcement should not have unlimited access to individual’s personal 
media devices.  
Interview Question 10 
 What is your opinion regarding the forensic tool GrayKey only being available to 
law enforcement? 
 All participants had very strong opinions against this tool being limited to certain 
individuals. They all felt as if there was no logical reason to have a limit tool when other 
tools are available to everyone. In their opinions, they felt as if it gave law enforcement 
an edge that others did not get in the court of law. 
Interview Question 11 
 What is your overall opinion regarding a solution for the issues the FBI and 
Apple continues to face with each other? Should the courts step in or should law 
enforcement and technology companies figure out a solution on their own? 
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 This was a very split question amongst the interviewees. Some felt that they did 
not see how the courts would be able to help the situation, while other felt that their 
needed to be more rulings on the situation. All felt that law enforcement and technology 
companies would not be able to come to a comprise, as they both had different agendas in 
the matter. They also mentioned that there would be no clear resolution with this issue no 
time soon.  
Themes by Research Question 
 This study consisted of two research questions: 
RQ1: What is the impact of encryption on mobile forensic investigations? 
RQ2: When considering national security, what are the perceptions of mobile forensic 
investigators concerning privacy rights? 
This section will summarize the study’s themes in accordance with the research questions 
presented. 
RQ1 
 Most participants within the study agreed that the encryption methods on devices 
affected criminal investigations in different ways. While there was discussion that this 
was not as big as concern as many may believe. With technology companies constantly 
coming up with new ways to encrypt their devices to protect the user’s privacy, it can 
sometimes delay mobile forensic examiners investigations. Even with law enforcement 
having special tools that helps circumvent most devices encryption methods, this still 
sometimes is not enough for the newer devices, as these tools only work on after they 




Participants all seemed to come to a common ideology, that when it comes to 
national security, privacy should potential be altered to a degree. While most didn’t mind 
their privacy being invaded, they only agreed with it if the proper channels were 
followed, i.e., going through the court system.  
Privacy was very important to all participants, but so was national security. Some 
agreed that technology companies should in fact work with mobile forensic examiners on 
certain cases, however they did not think they should be forced to by the government. 
One thing that was very common and obvious throughout all the participants interviews 
was that there needed to be some checks and balances in place when considering privacy. 
There also needed to be limitations on how law enforcement utilized national security 
concerns to circumvent individual’s privacy rights during investigations.  
Summary 
 In this chapter, I discussed the results of a phenomenology-based theory regarding 
mobile forensics and the perception of privacy. Ten individuals from backgrounds 
ranging from educators to actual practitioners, were afforded the opportunity to give their 
opinions on mobile forensics and advancing encryption methods by technology 
companies. Opinions were transcribed and then analyzed for common themes to collect a 
cohesive conclusion on the data collected.  
 The interviewed individuals seem to struggle with looking at it from a practitioner 
perspective and private citizen as their answer were carefully considered. While they all 
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would like to make life easier for mobile forensics examiners in the field, they also did 
not want to just give up their privacy rights all together as private citizens.  
They tended to agree that something needed to be done, but exactly what, was a 
very complex issue, as it would take potentially years to come to a full understanding and 
agreeance with both technology companies and mobile forensic examiners. As multiple 
participants put it during their interview, it is just a game of cat and mouse at this point, 
and no one has a solution to make everyone satisfied. In chapter 5, I will discuss future 
research that can be conducted along with personal reflections and interpretations of my 
results.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusions and Recommendations 
Introduction 
In this chapter, I discuss the results of this qualitative research study to understand 
effects technology companies’ encryption methods have on criminal investigations. I also 
discuss privacy concerns when considering national security. Questions have been raised 
in the Department of Justice and amongst technology companies, with there being no 
clear solution on how to resolve them.  
There were 10 individuals who were interviewed, and interviews were structured 
similarly, with few differences in terms of follow-up questions based off responses that 
were given to me. These individuals were government workers, educators, and 
practitioners. With the interview pool being limited, I decided to correlate common 
themes myself instead of using software.  
Results Summary 
 This study involved exploring a very rare topic that is not often discussed unless 
something significant happens in the U.S. Participants within this study all agreed that 
this was an interesting and important topic that has not been clearly addressed. They felt 
as if governments’ demand for technology companies were excessive. Privacy was one 
the biggest concerns participants had when it came to law enforcement requesting help 
from technology companies. They believed privacy was important to citizens; however, it 
is hindered when individuals decide to use social media.  
 National security was thought to be used too broadly from a law enforcement 
perspective and should not be used to gain access to individuals’ personal media devices. 
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Participants felt as if the only way law enforcement should be able to gain access to 
devices is if they went through proper channels such as court orders or consent from the 
individuals themselves. It was also noted that while law enforcement claims to not be 
able to access many devices, that is not completely the truth.  
 They also believed that law enforcement was not honest about data they had 
access to without getting into devices. Technology companies often comply with court 
orders to hand over data from their consumers, such as iCloud data on Apple devices. 
Such data can include mail and text messages. This is not sufficient for law enforcement, 
however, because this data can still be encrypted, which can leave law enforcement with 
the same issue as before.  
Findings 
 Recruitment of participants was done via social media sites or LinkedIn in 
addition to my prior knowledge of them working in the field. This ensured that 
participants were qualified to speak on the intended topic and comprehended questions 
being asked during interviews. Based off interviews with participants, I believe that 
research study addresses an ongoing issue that has not been properly addressed.  
 The results of the research study confirmed that participants all thought there was 
an underlying issue with privacy, encryption, and national security, however none had a 
clear solution on how to address their concerns. I believe this needs to continue to be 
researched from different perspectives as I only looked at it from mobile forensic 




 One of the primary limitations of this study involved the small sample size. 
Participants in this study needed to have knowledge of not only digital but also mobile 
forensics as well. With only 10 participants, this limited the number of diverse opinions 
needed to understand how significant the issue is. This study was also very lopsided in 
terms of gender, as the technology field is heavily saturated with men. While this was not 
a factor according to examiners, I think this can lead to bias, as the study was completed 
with a 80/20 split between genders.  
Social Change 
 Timing of such a study is imperative to current situations involving technology 
companies and the U.S. government. With the increase in domestic terrorism in the U.S., 
this issue is going to become even more relevant. With individuals using their 
smartphones for everyday life, these devices are going to become a focal point in 
criminal cases in more. Technology companies and forensic examiners are often going to 
be at odds and will eventually have to figure out ways to work together for the greater 
good of everyone involved. 
 Social change can be affected by this study in different ways. Enhancing 
communication between technology companies and mobile forensic examiners when it 
relates to encryption methods would help in terms of understanding their stances. 
Encryption methods on smartphone devices will continue to advance as criminals 
continue to find ways around them.  
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 As technology continues to advance along with encryption methods, I would hope 
this research study could begin the deep conversations needed between the mobile 
forensic examiners and technology companies. Using an interpretivist approach, there 
could be an understanding of both sides. However, until courts decide to address the 
issue, there will be no clear understanding between technology companies and law 
enforcement agencies when dealing with privacy. 
Recommendations 
 This qualitative research study was conducted with data from different 
demographic groups. Other research studies can be conducted involving general public 
opinions of the matter involving individuals who may have limited experience or 
knowledge concerning encryption issues. Also, interviewing individuals from technology 
companies would lead to different perspectives on the topic.  
 Another option would be to conduct a quantitative study regarding the topic with 
a much larger participant pool including individuals all over the U.S. The study can be 
conducted to gather the opinions of the general public and mobile forensic examiners to 
get a better understanding on how much privacy means to both. 
Personal Reflections 
 Conducting this study allowed me to reflect on a topic that is emerging. Mobile 
forensics are constantly changing and forcing technology companies to continue to think 
how to protect its consumers. When conducting this study, I was at the time entering into 
the field of digital forensics for the government. Being so new to the field afforded me 
the opportunity to address different angles and views from different examiners. I believe I 
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was able to understand a multitude of different perspectives no matter where examiners 
where currently working. 
 I was able to gain a significant amount of knowledge of the field by interviewing 
individuals from different backgrounds. I identified certain themes that came about based 
on where individuals may have worked or currently worked. While timing began to be an 
issue with interviewing law enforcement, speaking with prior individuals who have 
worked in law enforcement was just as beneficial because I believed their perspectives on 
current issues is very important to the topic. The government and private sectors must 
figure out how to coexist in the data protection realm. If not, this issue will be magnified.   
Conclusion 
 Digital forensics and especially mobile forensics is a field that is getting more 
complex. Encryption will continue to become more advanced as technology companies 
seek to find ways to continue to protect their consumers’ sensitive data. Eventually a 
compromise is going to have to happen, whether it comes from the courts or the 
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Appendix A: Letter of Invitation 
Greetings, 
  
I hope this note finds you well.  
I am currently a student at Walden University in the PhD program, working on 
my Dissertation Research Study. This research study will discuss national security, 
privacy and mobile forensics examinations. I am currently looking for volunteers willing 
to be interviewed who have at least one (1) year of experience as a Mobile Forensic 
Examiner. Participation in this study will be completely voluntarily.   
This will include completing an Informed Consent statement (I’ll e-mail this to 
you); and allowing me to interview you by phone, zoom or in person. The whole 
interview should take no more than 90 minutes of your time.  
 Please let me know if you would like to participate. Please let me know if 
you might be interested in participating and I will send you out the consent form which 
includes the full details about the study. I attend to start this process by 10/28/2020 and 
finish all interviews by 11/15/2020. 
You can contact me by phone 224-627-8474, and/or e-mail 






Appendix B: Interview Questions 
1. Are you familiar with the 2016 Supreme Court case Apple v. FBI? 
2. With the FBI dropping the case, what is your take on tech companies helping or 
not helping law enforcement in such cases? 
3. Do you believe that tech companies encryption methods, hinder mobile forensic 
investigations? 
4. What are your thoughts when considering law enforcement conducting mobile 
forensic examinations concerning encrypted smartphones?  
5. In your opinion, do you believe that if tech companies were to help during 
investigations, it would be a privacy concern for the public? 
6. Regarding social media and privacy, do you think as individuals we give our own 
privacy away? 
7. Do you think national security and privacy can collide with each other? 
8. Are you familiar with the verbiage used within the 4th amendment? If so, can you 
explain what it means to you? 
9. With the 4th amendment protecting individuals from unreasonable search and 
seizures, what are your thoughts when it comes to individual’s personal media 
equipment? 
10. What is your opinion regarding the forensic tool GrayKey only being available to 
law enforcement?  
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11. What is your overall opinion regarding a solution for the issues the FBI and Apple 
continues to face with each other? Should the courts step in or should law 
enforcement and technology companies figure out a solution on their own? 
 
